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TEACHING CONTRADICTION: A CASE STUDY

Mike Townsend*
I. INTRODUCTION

[L]earning law and about law has become a more complex and
difficult, but ultimately more enriching experience. Students of
the law ...must be familiar with and appreciate ... external
perspectives if they are to fully understand the law. 1
-Bailey

Kuklin and Jeffrey Stempel

One of the most difficult realities confronting first-year law students
is that American legal education is simultaneously theoretical and metatheoretical. At one moment students are at the "theoretical" level, by
which I mean that they work "within" or "inside" the "black letter" in the

context of various factual settings. In the next instant, students move to
the "meta-theoretical" level, talking "about" the black letter from a
number of "perspectives." 2 That is, they slide between "learning law"
and "learning about law." Many students find such transitions to be
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A. 1973, M.A. 1978,
Ph.D. 1982, University of Michigan; J.D. 1989, Yale University. The author wishes to
thank Lou Wolcher and Kate O'Neill, both of whom made many valuable suggestions.
1. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 2 (1994).
2. Actually, there is a third level, the "meta-meta-theoretical," in which we talk
about talking about law. That is, if we identify the theory with the black letter and the
meta-theory with critiques of the black letter, then the "meta-meta-theoretical" involves
critiques of the critiques. For the purposes of this article, no great distinction will be
made between the meta-theoretical and the "meta-meta-theoretical." Of course, there are
some who deny the intelligibility of these distinctions. Ronald Dworkin, for example,
critiques Richard Rorty for distinguishing between "the internal level at which some
practical enterprise like law . . . is carried on" and "the external level at which
philosophers and other theorists talk about these enterprises rather than participate in
them."
Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359, 361-62 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds.,
1991).
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problematic, bewildering, and even stressful.
One response, for students and teachers alike, is to eschew metatheoretical discussions altogether. Indeed, to the extent that metatheoretical perspectives reflect the influence of other disciplines, concern
about the backgrounds of students and teachers raises questions about
how profitably such matters can be covered in law schools at all.3
Another response is to confront the problem head on by providing
focused discussions of various meta-theoretical perspectives. As some
suggest, consideration of such perspectives in turn facilitates learning at
the theoretical level.4 In particular, such consideration enriches doctrinal
learning by providing a context in the Western intellectual tradition with
which most first-year students have at least some previous experience.
This article describes one attempt to provide such focused discussions in
a first-year contracts course.
In my classroom, I use the phenomenon of contradictionto introduce
three traditional meta-theoretical perspectives: mechanical jurisprudence,
legal realism, and critical legal studies. For the purposes of this exercise,
I tell students that the concept of "contradiction" in law refers to a
situation in which the law provides two diametrically-opposed answers
to the same legal question.
Contract law provides a number of opportunities for discussing
contradiction.
The specific vehicle chosen here is the second
Restatement of Contracts section 205 which, roughly speaking, represents
one attempt to meld the objective and subjective approaches to contract
formation.6
The purpose of this article is not to present any systematic or detailed
overview of meta-theoretical perspectives. Indeed, meta-theoretical
perspectives are more properly "experienced" than they are "learned."
Rather, the idea here is to present a concrete and nuanced example of the
introduction of perspectives into a typical first-year course. Section 20
provides a "case study" of what might be accomplished in the pedagogy
of "teaching contradiction." In addition, this case study provides an
3. Cf Patricia D. White, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.,
Teaching Philosophy of Law in Law Schools: Some Cautionary Remarks, Remarks at
the AALS Workshop on Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy and Their Application to
the Basic Curriculum (Mar. 20-22), in 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 563 (1986).
4. See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 1, at 2.

5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981).
6. 1 have presented the basic ideas of this article to several contracts classes,
including both large-group and small-group classes.
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example of the symbiotic pedagogical
theoretical and the meta-theoretical.

relationship between the

II. CONTRADICTION AND META-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. Section 20
When a court determines whether a party has assented to an
agreement, is it the party's actual or its apparent intention that
matters? This question provoked one of the most significant
doctrinal struggles in the development of contract law, that
between the subjective and objective theories.7
-E. Allan Farnsworth
For present purposes, the subjective-objective issue in contract
formation,8 especially in its Restatement incarnation, offers several
pedagogical advantages. First, much meta-theoretical discussion deals
with the common law, so that contract law is a reasonable context for
introducing perspectives. Second, students normally study formation
material early in their first year. Finally, the explicit black-letter portion
of the Restatement allows students to focus on the phenomenon of
contradiction rather than engage in an extended discussion about whether
two given judicial opinions actually are contradictory. 9 Although the
Restatement is not law per se, it generally is regarded as a very important
and influential indication of what the common law is (or should be). In
any case, I treat section 20 as if it were law for the purposes of this
exercise.
Without trying to rehash a debate that is well known and extremely
prolix, suffice it to say that most contracts commentators agree that
neither the objective nor the subjective position is wholly tenable in
contract law. On the one hand, "[y]ou can't escape contractual
obligation by signing with your fingers crossed behind your back."' On
the other hand, "the staunchest 'objectivist' would not let a jury hold two
parties to an apparently manifested agreement if neither thought the other
7. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 116 (3d ed. 1999).
8. This article focuses on contract formation through deals, not through other devices
such as plaintiffis reliance or the seal.
9. It also allows one to sidestep some of the more complicated particulars that
routinely come up in statutory and constitutional interpretation.
10. Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1988).

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. 33

meant to assent."" Indeed, Arthur Corbin concluded that neither theory
alone suffices as an analytical aide.12 As a result, one would rightly
expect the Restatement approach to contain both objective and subjective
dimensions.
The second Restatement's treatment is contained in section 20. In
the case of a subjective agreement on the meanings of purported
manifestations of assent, the illustrations to section 20 imply that the
common subjective understanding governs.' 3 In the case of a subjective
disagreement, the black-letter law provides the following:
§20. Effect of Misunderstanding
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange
if the parties attach materially different meanings to their
manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning
attached by the other; or
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the
meaning attached by the other.
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in
accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of the
parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning
attached by the other, and the other knows the meaning
attached by the first party; or
(b) that party has no reason to know of any different
meaning attached by the other, and the other4 has reason to
know the meaning attached by the first party.
As indicated in the introduction, the "theoretical" level is the level at
which students work within such a "rule." For example, I ask students to
work with the black-letter law in the context of certain well-known firstyear staples in the area of misunderstandings. 5
11. Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 509 (Or. 1977).
12.

1.

1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 106 (1963).

13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 20 cmt. d, illus.

14. Id. § 20.
15. I spend some time on Embry v. Hargadine,McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W.
777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). In response to an employee's offer of fixed-term employment,
coupled with a demand that unless such employment was forthcoming the employee
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More important for the purposes of this article is the meta-theoretical
consideration of consistency. Formally, consider two parties who attach
differing subjective meanings. For present purposes, assume there are
two possible meanings-there is a contract ("K") and there is not a
contract ("No K"). 16 Further assume that each party is interested in
pursuing its own understanding.17
According to section 20, there are two determinations made with
respect to each party. First, a party either knows or does not know of the
other party's attached meaning. 8 Second, a party either has or does not
have reason to know of the other party's attached meaning.1 9 The
relevant time frame is the moment of purported assent. It is critical to
understand that there is no necessary dependence of these
determinations. The independence of the determinations with respect to
would leave then and there, the employer replied: "Go ahead, you're all right. Get your
men out, and don't let that worry you." Id. The employer later terminated the employee.
Id. The employee sued and the issue was whether the employer's response constituted an
acceptance. Id. at 779. The case posits a subjective disagreement in which the employee
sees the employer's response as an acceptance but the employer does not. At the
theoretical level, I ask, for example, what part of section 20 seems to track the court's
analysis.
16. In Embry, 105 S.W. 777, for example, the employee attaches the meaning "K" to
the employer's manifestations, but the employer attaches the meaning "No K." Id.
Section 20 applies to the determination of whether there has been an accepted offer, and
hence a contract so formed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, §
20 cmt. c.
17. Can either party apply section 20 to obtain the meaning of the other? Go back to
Embry, 105 S.W. 777, where the employee thought there was a fixed-term employment
contract and the employer did not. Given that the employer wanted to terminate the
employee and the employee wanted to stay, each party was trying to assert its own
understanding. Now assume the same subjective understandings, but suppose that it is
the employee who later wants to "quit," and the employer does not want the employee to
leave. Under this scenario, it is to the advantage of the employee to assert the employer's
understanding that there was no fixed-term employment contract, and it is to the
advantage of the employer to assert the employee's understanding that there was a fixedterm employment contract.
The Restatement is not clear on whether one party can use section 20 to assert the
other party's prior understanding. On the one hand, if we look at the way unknown offers
of rewards are handled, the answer would appear to be that the person must be asserting
his or her own understanding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5,
§ 23 cmt. c, illus. 2. On the other hand, the comments and reporter's note say that section
201 adopts the section 20 logic for subjective disagreement in interpretation. See id. §
201 cmt. b & Reporter's Note. Comment d to section 201 states the following: "In some
cases a party can waive the misunderstanding and enforce the contract in accordance with
the understanding of the other party." Id. § 201 cmt. d.
18. See id § 20.
19. Id.
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a given party follows entirely from the formal structure of the black
letter, together with the canon of construction that all words must be
given meaning. 20 Indeed, iif determining a given party "had reason to
know" also implied that party was "knowing," then section 20(1)(b)
would be logically equivalent to "each party knows the meaning attached
by the other.",2 1 Similarly, if "knowing" implied "having reason to
know," then section 20(l)(b) would be logically equivalent to "each
party has reason to know the meaning attached by the other." 22 It is also

20. It also follows from the Restatement definitions. The second Restatement defines
knowledge as "conscious belief in the truth of a fact." Id. § 19 cmt. b. According to the
Restatement:
A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he has information
from which a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in
question does or will exist. A person of superior intelligence has reason to
know a fact if he has information from which a person of his intelligence would
draw the inference. There is also reason to know if the inference would be that
there is such a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, if exercising
reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, the person would
predicate his action upon the assumption of its possible existence.
Id. The Restatement goes on to say that "[r]eason to know is to be distinguished from
knowledge." Id.
This analysis is clouded somewhat by section 162(1)(a)'s "knows or believes,"
which is used to describe a mental state sufficient for fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. §
162(1)(a). Given section 19 comment b's discussion, such a phrase would appear to
render one of section 162(1)(a)'s words superfluous. Moreover, section 162's comment b
states the following: "[K]nowledge of falsity is not essential, and it is sufficient ... if he
believes the assertion to be false." Id. § 162 cmt. b. No explanation is given. Again, this
is somewhat odd given section 19 comment b's discussion. Section 162's black letter
and comments are similar to the Restatement of Torts, where no explanation is given
either. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 & cmt. c (1977). The idea seems to
be that "first-hand" information leading to a belief of falsity is not required. For the
purposes of this article, section 162 is ignored.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 19 cmt. b.
("Knowledge means conscious belief in the truth of a fact; reason to know need not be
conscious."). Colloquially speaking, a person may have reason to know of a fact without
having a conscious belief in the truth of that fact. The wording of section 20(l)(b) also
implies that it is possible for a person to have an understanding even in the face of a
belief that the other person has a different understanding. See id. § 20(1)(b). In Embry,
105 S.W. 777, for example, the employee could attach the meaning of "K" even though
the employee believes that the employer has attached the meaning "No K."
22. The idea that the law draws a distinction between a conscious belief and a
reasonable conscious belief troubles some students. Colloquially speaking, a person may
have a conscious belief in the truth of a fact without having reason to know of that fact. I
refer students to the second Restatement of Torts, which makes the distinction clear in its
section 11, as does the phenomenon of overturned jury verdicts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 11.
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clear from the wording that the determinations of one party need not
depend on those of the other.
As a result of these distinctions, section 20 as a whole contains
sixteen possible "cases" that could arise where each "case" would be
distinguishable from the other fifteen. These sixteen cases are given in
the table below. Columns "A" and "B" denote a particular party's
comprehension of the other's state of mind; column "§ 20" then indicates
"case" outcomes concerning the subsections of section 20, displaying
some conflicting results.
A

B
Has

§ 20
Has

Knows

reason to

Knows

B's state

know

A's state

know

of mind

B's state

of mind

A's state

of mind

reason to

(1)(a)

(1)(b)

1

N

N

N

N

7

N
N
N
N
N
N

N
N
N
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
N
N
Y

Y
N
Y
N
Y
N

8
9

N
Y

Y
N

Y
N

Y
N

10
11

Y
Y

N
N

N
Y

Y
N

12
13

Y
Y

N
Y

Y
N

Y
N

No K

14

Y

Y

N

Y

No K

15

Y

Y

Y

N

No K

16

Y

Y

Y

Y

No K

5

6

(2)(b)

of mind

2

3
4

(2)(a)

No K
A
A
A

A
B

No K
A

No K

B

A
B
B

A

B

A
B

No K

B

B

With respect to contradictions, start with case 7. Note that section
20(2)(a) shows that A's understanding prevails, but section 20(2)(b)
shows that B's understanding prevails! Given the assumption that one
party attaches the meaning "K" and the other party attaches the meaning
"No K," we see that the explicit black letter of section 20 yields a
contradiction in this case by providing two diametrically opposed
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answers to the same legal question.
Continuing this analysis, one can see that there are contradictions in
cases 7 and 10, possible contradictions in cases 8 and 12 (if A's
understanding is "K"), and possible contradictions in cases 14 and 15 (if
B's understanding is "K").23 Put another way, cases 7 and 10 involve
conflicts between sections 20(2)(a) and 20(2)(b); cases 8 and 14 involve
conflicts between sections 20(1)(b) and 20(2)(a); and cases 12 and 15
involve conflicts between sections 20(1)(b) and 20(2)(b).24 Exposing
these contradictions leads naturally into a discussion of (at least one
version of) mechanical jurisprudence.
B. MechanicalJurisprudenceand Contradiction
[Law] is... a body of general principles ....
...
[N]ot only must the law... apply to every act done...
but only one law can so apply. If two laws were present at the
same time and in the same place upon the same subject we
should.., have a condition of anarchy.

... The principle function of law is not the settling of

23. The Restatement does say that later "[r]ules of interpretation ... are applicable in
the determination of what each party 'knows or has reason to know."' RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

supra note 5, § 20 cmt. c. If these rules are meant to preclude

the problematic cases from occurring, then it is not clear (to me at least) how they do so.
24. I usually fill in a few rows in class and ask the students to complete the table as
homework. Some students have trouble with section 20(l)(a). In particular, some
suggest reading section 20(l)(a) as "neither party knows the meaning attached by the
other or neither party has reason to know the meaning attached by the other." In this
regard, I point out three things. First, the most common reading of section 20(1)(a) is
this: "It is not the case that any party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached
by the other." I ask them to think about the statement, "I am neither Republican or
Democrat." Second, section 20(2)(b) shows that the ALI knew how to use the sentence
structure underlying this student suggestion when they wanted to. Finally, although it is
not a textual argument per se, I ask them to consider comment d: "The basic principle
governing material misunderstanding is stated in Subsection (1): no contract is formed if
neither party is at fault or if both parties are equally at fault." Id. § 20 cmt. d. This
apparently describes section 20(l)(a) as the situation in which neither party is at fault.
For the purposes of the class discussion, I adopt the meaning indicated in the chart,
although I tell students the use of the word "nor" would have been preferable. In any
case, the alternate reading does not eliminate all contradictions and yields some of its
own (which I ask students to detail).
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disputes; it is rather the prevention of disputes ....
-Joseph

H. Beale

The vast and ever increasing volume of the decisions of the
courts establishing new rules or precedents, and the numerous
instances in which the decisions are irreconcilable has resulted in
ever increasing uncertainty in the law. The American Law
Institute was formed in the belief that in order to clarify and
simplify the law and to render it more certain, the first step must
be the preparation of an orderly restatement of the common
law ....
The function of the courts is to decide the controversies
brought before them. The function of the Institute is to state
clearly and precisely... the principles and rules of the common
law.26
-Restatement (First) of Contracts
For the purposes of class discussion, I identify mechanical
jurisprudence with a late nineteenth-century wave of interdisciplinarity
based largely on a preference for the structures and decision-making
apparatuses of the natural sciences and mathematics. Along the lines of
Beale's comments, I tell students that mechanical jurisprudence deals
largely with two questions.27 First, is the (sub)system of law complete?
Second, is it consistent? Roughly speaking, the first question asks
whether at least one answer is provided for any relevant question, and the
second question asks whether at most one answer is provided.2 8
As indicated by the above quotation, the Restatement black letter
reflects this perspective.29 Consistency and completeness further the
basic goal of resolving or avoiding disputes.3 ° In this way, section 20
provides a convenient avenue for introducing students to the mechanical-

25.

1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 45-47 (1935).

26. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS viii, xi (1932).
27. This description of mechanical jurisprudence is based largely on Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1983).
28. I do not provide technical definitions.
29. See Grey, supra note 27, at 43. The quotation from the first Restatement also
reflects a mechanical-jurisprudence concern with clarity. See supra text accompanying

note 26.
30. See BEALE, supra note 25, at 47; Grey, supra note 27, at 32.
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jurisprudence view of legal systems as doctrine-based engines concerned
with disputes.
As is evident, the section 20 black letter addresses the completeness
concern by providing at least one answer for all possible instantiations of
the relevant variables-that is, for each of the sixteen possible casesbut there is a problem with consistency. Inconsistency would render
section 20 untenable from the mechanical-jurisprudence point of view.
Students quickly realize that to the extent mechanical jurisprudence
focuses on consistency and completeness, it has certain "limitations."
For example, such a normative focus does not offer a mechanism for
addressing an inconsistency once identified.
Thus, mechanical
jurisprudence has trouble dealing both with change and more general
normative analyses in the common-law setting.3' Consequently, the class
discussion leads naturally to a consideration of (at least one form of)
legal realism.
C. Legal Realism and Contradiction
(a) If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the
effect of a given premise; and if there is available a competing
but equally authoritative premise that leads to a different
conclusion-then there is a choice in the case; a choice to be
justified; a choice which can be justified only as a question of
policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked
tongue.
(b) If (i) the possible inductions from one case or a series of
cases--even if these cases really had each a single fixed
meaning-are nonetheless not single, but many; and if (ii) the

31. See Grey, supra note 27, at 15, 32, 39. Discussions about limitations of
mechanical jurisprudence occur at the meta-meta-theoretical level. For example, one
works within section 20 at the theoretical level, one critiques section 20 at the metatheoretical level, and one discusses the methodology of critique at the meta-metatheoretical level. Although I point out this distinction to students, I make more of the
distinction between the theoretical and meta-theoretical.
Moreover, I do not spend any time on the use of Godel's Theorems to engage in a
meta-meta-theoretical critique of the mechanical-jurisprudence goals of consistency and
completeness. For an analysis of such critiques, see Mike Townsend, Implications of
FoundationalCrises in Mathematics: A Case Study in InterdisciplinaryLegal Research,
71 WASH. L. REv. 51 (1996). Others have used Arrow's Theorem to question the
consistency goal in certain collective settings. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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standard authoritative techniques of dealing with precedent range
from limiting the case to its narrowest issue on facts and
procedure, and even searching the record for a hidden
distinguishing fact, all the way to giving it the widest meaning
the rule expressed will allow, or even thrusting under it a
principle which was not announced in the opinion at all-then
the available leeway in interpretation of precedent is (relatively
to what the older tradition has consciously conceived) nothing
less than huge. And only policy considerations and the facing of
policy considerations can justify "interpreting" (making,
shaping, drawing conclusions from) the relevant body of
precedent in one way or in another.... Let this be recognized,

and precedent is clearly seen to be a way of change as well as a
way of refusing to change. Let this be recognized, and that
peculiar one of the ways of working with precedent which
consists in blinding the eyes to policy loses the fictitious sanctity
with which it is now enveloped some of the time: to wit,
32
whenever judges for any reason do not wish to look at policy.

-Karl

Llewellyn

No less significant... was the profound shift in style
inaugurated by Restatement, Second: the introduction of
extensive commentary explaining and expounding the black
letter ....
-Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Legal realism is multifaceted, and it is difficult to capture in a brief
description.3 4 For the purposes of the introductory class discussion, I
identify legal realism with an early twentieth-century wave of
interdisciplinarity based largely on the social sciences. According to this
view of legal realism, the types of abstract legal concepts and
mechanistic reasoning that are characteristic of mechanical jurisprudence
are replaced by abstract social concepts and an explicit social-sciencebased policy analysis using both instrumentalist and deontological

32. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Respondingto Dean Pound, 44

HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1252-53 (1930-1931) (footnotes omitted).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at viii.
34. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW
AT CENTURY'S END 26 (1995).

AND JURISPRUDENCE
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concerns. 35 That is, realists do not reject the search for consistent (or
Instead, the argument with mechanical
even complete) systems.
jurisprudence is about the appropriate internal structure of such
systems.3 6
As indicated by the quotation, the second Restatement represents a
turn towards realism to the extent that the comments for section 20
include a policy analysis left out of the corresponding section in the first
Restatement. 37 Consequently, section 20 provides a convenient avenue
for introducing students to the legal-realist view of legal systems as
policy-based engines concerned with social change.
Comment d suggests a policy framework for the section 20 situation.
"The basic principle governing material misunderstanding is stated in
Subsection (1): no contract is formed if neither party is at fault or if both
(2) deals with cases where both
parties are equally at fault. Subsection
38
fault.",
at
equally
not
parties are
Consider the problematic cases in light of such a framework. Case 8
represents a conflict between sections 20(1)(b) and 20(2)(a). Does the
According to
policy analysis resolve the resulting contradiction?
comment d, section 20(1)(b) indicates that both parties are equally at
39
fault and section 20(2)(a) indicates that one party is more at fault;
therefore, the legal-realist machinery has produced its own contradiction!
Continuing this analysis, it would appear that cases 8 and 14, as well as
cases 12 and 15, involve situations where parties are simultaneously
"equally at fault" and "not equally at fault." Similarly, it would appear

35. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins
and Underpinnings,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 507 (1986).

36. See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 34, at 30-31 (describing "progressive legal realism").
Such an argument with mechanical jurisprudence is a meta-meta-theoretical argument.
Under this view, legal realism involves a move from the black letter to the policies
underlying the black letter. This legal realist move also can be seen as a shift away from
the black letter and toward the judicial decision. Such a shift thus represents a turn away
from the black letter and toward the "decider" and the "causes" of the decision. This turn
is completed by critical legal studies, or at least the version of critical legal studies
presented below. See id. at 28-31 (asserting that critical legal studies grew out of "radical
legal realism").
37. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 20 cmt. d, with
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 26, § 71 cmt. a. Casebooks underwent
a similar transformation. See, e.g., KuKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 1,at 157 (discussing
move to "cases and materials" structure).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 20 cmt. d. I ask students

to consider whether the Restatement's thrust is deontological or instrumental.
39. Id.
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that cases 7 and 10 involve situations in which A and B are each more at
fault. The policy explanation has not resolved these conflicts.
The response of the type of legal realism presented here is that one
needs more interdisciplinarity (e.g., a more nuanced understanding of
degrees of fault) to resolve the contradiction "properly" (that is,
according to the underlying policies). 40 But students might wonder if
there is not a more fundamental problem.
D. CriticalLegal Studies and Contradiction
The descriptive portrait of mainstream liberal thought that I
present is a picture of a system of thought that is simultaneously
beset by internal contradiction (not by "competing concerns"
artfully balanced until a wise equilibrium is reached, but by
irreducible, irremediable, irresolvable conflict) and by systematic
repressionof the presence of these contradictions.41
-Mark Kelman
Most people in the legal academy agree, albeit often with some
reluctance, that law is politics in the superficial sense that we can
talk about identifiably liberal and conservative positions on
various issues in the law .... The indeterminacy argument and
the critique of social theory led [critical legal studies] to a
different understanding of the proposition that law is politics.
We saw law as a form of human activity in which political
conflicts were worked out in ways that contributed to the
stability of the social order ("legitimation") in part by
constituting personality and social institutions in ways that came
to seem natural.42
-Mark Tushnet
Section 20 provides a convenient avenue for introducing students to
the critical-legal-studies (CLS) idea of ineluctable contradiction.4 3
40. See, e.g.,

MINDA,

supra note 34, at 58-59.

41. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STuDIEs 3 (1987).

42. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100

YALE

L.J.

1515, 1526 (1991).
43. It has been my experience that many students resist the notion of ineluctable
contradiction. I tell them that this reflects the pull of mechanical jurisprudence. In the
present context, students often turn to the illustrations.
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Illustration 1 reads as follows:
1. A offers to sell B goods shipped from Bombay ex steamer "Peerless". B
accepts. There are two steamers of the name "Peerless", sailing from Bombay
at materially different times. If both parties intend the same Peerless, there is a
contract, and it is immaterial whether they know or have reason to know that
two ships are named Peerless.
supra note 5, § 20 cmt. d, illus. 1. This is an
example of the principle that a subjective agreement governs.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

Illustration 2 reads as follows:
2. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, A means Peerless No. 1
and B means Peerless No. 2. If neither A nor B knows or has reason to know
that they mean different ships, or if they both know or if they both have reason
to know, there is no contract.
Id. § 20 cmt. d, illus. 2. It is possible that this is merely recapitulating sections 20(l)(a)
and 20(l)(b) without recognizing the existence of conflicts between sections 20(l)(b) and
20(2)(a)/20(2)(b). That is, the illustration might envision only cases 1, 6, 11, and 16.
Reading more broadly, it can be seen to refer also to cases 8, 12, 14, and 15. Cases 12
and 15 involve conflicts between section 20(l)(b) and section 20(2)(b). Thus, this
illustration can be seen to resolve the issue in favor of section 20(1)(b) over section
20(2)(b). Similarly, the illustration can be read to resolve cases 8 and 14 in favor of
section 20(l)(b) over section 20(2)(a).
Illustration 3 reads as follows:
3. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, A knows that B means
Peerless No. 2 and B does not know that there are two ships named Peerless.
There is a contract for the sale of the goods from Peerless No. 2, and it is
immaterial whether B has reason to know that A means Peerless No. 1. If A
makes the contract with the undisclosed intention of not performing it, it is
voidable by B for misrepresentation (see [sections] 159-64). Conversely, if B
knows that A means Peerless No. 1 and A does not know that there are two
ships named Peerless, there is a contract for the sale of the goods from Peerless
No. 1, and it is immaterial whether A has reason to know that B means Peerless
No. 2, but the contract may be voidable by A for misrepresentation.
Id. § 20 cmt. d, illus. 3. This seems to cover cases 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14. Cases 7
and 10 involve conflict between section 20(2)(a) and section 20(2)(b). Thus, the
illustration can be read to resolve the conflict in favor of section 20(2)(a) over section
20(2)(b). Cases 8 and 14 involve conflict between section 20(l)(b) and section 20(2)(a).
Thus, the illustration can be read to resolve the conflict in favor of section 20(2)(a) over
section 20(1)(b), conflicting with the broader reading of illustration 2.
Illustration 4 reads as follows:
4. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, neither party knows that
there are two ships Peerless. A has reason to know that B means Peerless No. 2
and B has no reason to know that A means Peerless No. 1. There is a contract
for the sale of goods from Peerless No. 2. In the converse case, where B has

20081

Teaching Contradiction

reason to know and A does not, there is a contract for sale from Peerless No. 1.
In either case the question whether the contract is voidable for mistake is
governed by the rules stated in [sections] 151-58.
Id. § 20 cmt. d, illus. 4. I take this to cover cases 2 and 5. (But not cases 4, 7, 10, 12, 13,
and 15, as those cases can be said to involve at least one party knowing that there is more
than one ship by virtue of knowing the other party's state of mind. If those cases were to
be covered, then we would have conflicts with illustration 3 and also with the broader
reading of illustration 2.)
Illustration 5 reads as follows:
5. A says to B, "I offer to sell you my horse for $100." B, knowing that A
intends to offer to sell his cow for that price, not his horse, and that the word
"horse" is a slip of the tongue, replies, "I accept." The price is a fair one for
either the horse or the cow. There is a contract for the sale of the cow and not
of the horse. If B makes the contract with the undisclosed intention of not
performing it, it is voidable by A for misrepresentation. See [sections] 159-64.
Id. § 20 cmt. d, illus. 5. This can be read to cover cases 3, 4, 9, and 13, or it might be
seen to cover the principle that a subjective agreement governs.
The upshot is the following: illustration 3 can be said to resolve the conflict in
cases 7 and 10 in favor of section 20(2)(a) over section 20(2)(b) and to resolve the
conflict in cases 8 and 14 in favor of section 20(2)(a) over section 20(1)(b). A broad
reading of illustration 2 resolves the conflict in cases 12 and 15 in favor of section
20(l)(b) over section 20(2)(b) and the conflict in cases 8 and 14 in favor of section
20(1)(b) over section 20(2)(a). The latter introduces a conflict between illustrations 2 and
3 with respect to cases 8 and 14. A narrow reading of illustration 2 does not disturb
illustration 3's preference of section 20(2)(a) over section 20(1)(b), but leaves the conflict
between section 20(1)(b) and section 20(2)(b) in cases 12 and 15 unresolved.
Illustrations 1, 4, and 5 offer nothing toward resolving the problematic cases.
Students also offer other canons of construction. A recurring student suggestion is
to let the earlier govern the later. That is, the governing subsection is the first one that
applies. Others suggest that the later govern the earlier. Of course, one problem for both
suggestions is illustration 3 which picks the earlier section 20(2)(a) over the later section
20(2)(b), but also picks the later section 20(2)(a) over the earlier section 20(l)(b).
Another problem is section 201. The comments and reporter's note say that section 201
See
adopts the section 20 logic for subjective disagreement in interpretation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 201 cmt. b & Reporter's Note.
With respect to the textual-order arguments, however, section 201 lists the section 20(2)
cases first.
Some students go to great lengths to, and it is possible to, cobble together a
consistent interpretation by combining sections 20 and 201. Given that section 201
purports to be using the logic of section 20, section 201(3) and comment d can be read to
suggest that section 20(2) should govern, if at all possible, in cases of subjective
disagreement. Putting this together with section 20's illustration 3 and a narrow reading
of section 20's illustration 2, one might argue that the Restatement means to resolve cases
7 and 10 in favor of section 20(2)(a), cases 8 and 14 in favor of section 20(2)(a), and
cases 12 and 15 in favor of section 20(2)(b).
However, such a solution still raises mechanical-jurisprudence and legal-realism
issues. With respect to mechanical jurisprudence, the reasoning leading to the solution
lacks clarity. In terms of legal-realist fault, the solution can be seen as saying that
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Several scholars have discussed contract law's subjective-objective
debate in terms of the classic critical-legal-studies dichotomies of self
versus other and private versus public.44 Roughly speaking, the
irresolvable tensions between the self and the other and between the
private and the public result in inevitable and fundamental conflicts in
contract law to the extent that the law attempts to assign preferences
across a wide range of factual settings.45 In the context of section 20, we
may identify the subjective with "self' and "private" and the objective
with "other" and "public." In this sense, cases 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 15
represent underlying conflicts between the subjective-self-private
("knowledge," i.e., belief) and the objective-other-public ("having reason
to know"). 46 The pervasive nature of the problem for contract law is
illustrated by the second Restatement's use of the section 20 approach in
other areas. 47
As with legal realism, critical legal studies is multifaceted, and it is
difficult to capture in a brief description. Indeed, Tushnet says that CLS
represents more of a "political location" than a group of "essential
intellectual component[s]. 4 8 Nonetheless, I describe CLS to students
"knowing" involves more fault than "having reason to know" (in taking section 20(2)(a)
over section 20(2)(b)) and that section 20(2) will break any fault-based tie coming out of
section 20(1) (in taking section 20(2)(a) over section 20(1)(b) and section 20(2)(b) over
section 20(l)(b)). However, one can probe the coherence of such general reasoning
about fault with specific hypotheticals.
44. See generally J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
L.J. 743 (1987); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Jay M. Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 829 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 44, at 999-1001.
46. Clare Dalton discusses a deeper level of analysis in which underlying tensions are
revealed. For example, "having reason to know" has both objective and subjective
aspects in that it is based on facts in actual possession (subjective) and inferences that a
person of ordinary intelligence (objective), or superior intelligence if present (subjective),
would make. Dalton argues that this conflict leads to difficulties in the preliminary
determination of whether a party has reason to know. See id. at 1058-62.
47. Second Restatement section 201 purports to apply the same structure to
interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 201 cmt. b &
Reporter's Note. The Restatement also suggests that the question of whether there is a
stand-alone promise (which may come up in connection with section 90's reliance-on-astand-alone-promise principle) is handled by section 20 ideas. See id. § 2 cmt. b.
Comment b to section 76 seems to have a somewhat incomplete application of section 20
to the question of whether there is a promise. See id. § 76 cmt. b. Presumably, section 20
could be applied wherever the subjective-objective issue arises.
48. Tushnet, supra note 42, at 1516.
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along the following lines. Inconsistency allows one to logically derive
anything, and inconsistent systems therefore lack logical determinacy.
To the extent that law faces irremediable contradiction, the law faces
irremediable logical indeterminacy. How then are decisions reached?
As Tushnet suggests, at least some critical-legal-studies scholars have
latched onto the idea of law as politics, an arena where ineluctable
contradiction is part of the territory. This is not to say that lawyers
cannot predict outcomes-only that the traditional mechanicaljurisprudence and legal-realist systems are not the grounds of whatever
predicted uniformity is found. 4 9 Rather, the "social location of the
decider" (race, class, gender, etc.) comes to the fore as the most
significant factor in accounting for outcomes. In this sense, law
fundamentally is concerned with the question of where individual
preferences, both conscious and unconscious, come from and the
question of how preference conflicts are resolved in collective settings.
Roughly speaking, this view of critical legal studies treats legal systems
as politics-based engines concerned with preference-value-power
allocation.50
IV. CONCLUSION

I tried to straighten it out and get it into a form where I could
understand it. I think I am carrying out the logic with some
rigor.... [Section 20] tries to deal with all of the
51
permutations ....
-Reporter Robert Braucher
The section 20 black letter does deal with all the "permutations" (that

49. Such critiques of legal realism and mechanical jurisprudence are meta-metatheoretical in nature.
50. I tell students that there is some debate in the CLS community about the extent to
which such a view is immune from what all critical-legal-studies scholars agree are
crippling problems facing mechanical jurisprudence and legal realism. See, e.g., MINDA,
supra note 34, at 298 n.93 (describing internal CLS debate between "nihilism" and
"reformis[m]").
Situating critical legal studies is problematic, but I tell students that I identify
critical legal studies with a mid-to-late twentieth-century wave of interdisciplinarity
based largely on the humanities, especially certain strains of literary theory, philosophy,
and cultural studies.
51. Robert Braucher, Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts, 41
A.L.I. PROC. 293, 319 (1964).
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is, all sixteen cases). Unfortunately, it has problems with consistency.
As such, it provides for an excellent introduction to the phenomenon of
contradiction, to various perspectives on the law, and to the pedagogical
symbiosis between the theoretical and meta-theoretical.

